The premise is no longer theoretical. Reuters reported Tuesday that Iranian planners had long assumed a direct clash with Washington and Israel was possible and built a layered response around missiles, drones and economic disruption. Hours later, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps said oil would not be allowed to leave the region if the attacks continued, underscoring that Tehran sees energy leverage as a weapon, not merely a bargaining chip.
Why the Iran war is shifting toward energy disruption
That matters because the conflict does not have to close the Strait of Hormuz permanently to hurt. A Reuters review of tanker traffic showed daily tanker passages collapsing to zero on March 5 from 37 on Feb. 27, the day before the first U.S.-Israeli strikes. Even a short paralysis can delay cargoes, spike freight costs and reinforce the sense of scarcity that moves oil markets faster than damaged infrastructure alone.
The geography is what makes the threat so potent. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says about 20 million barrels a day moved through Hormuz in 2024, equal to about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption, while roughly one-fifth of global LNG trade also crossed the strait. EIA also estimates 84% of the crude and condensate moving through Hormuz went to Asian markets, meaning the first-round shock would fall hardest on major importers such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.
Bypass routes exist, but they are too limited to erase the shock. The International Energy Agency estimates nearly 20 million barrels a day of oil moved through Hormuz in 2025, while only 3.5 million to 5.5 million barrels a day of alternative pipeline capacity could redirect flows around the choke point. In plain terms, Tehran does not need a perfect blockade; it needs a disruption large enough to make insurers, tanker owners and buyers hesitate.
That is why attacks on ports, refineries and loading points matter as much as threats against ships themselves. The more Gulf producers have to reroute barrels, idle output or pay wartime freight premiums, the more Tehran can claim it is imposing costs far beyond the battlefield. For Washington and Israel, military gains do not automatically translate into lower economic risk if Iran can keep generating repeated shocks to shipping and energy infrastructure.
How the Iran war taps an older Hormuz playbook
This approach did not appear overnight. Reuters reported in June 2019 that attacks on two tankers near the Gulf of Oman raised fears of confrontation along the same energy corridor after tensions with Washington escalated. Another Reuters report in April 2023 detailed Iran’s seizure of the tanker Advantage Sweet in international waters, and a July 2025 Reuters exclusive said U.S. sources believed Iran had prepared mines for the strait during an earlier crisis even though the waterway remained open.
The continuity matters because it shows Tehran has spent years refining a gray-zone method built around harassment, selective seizures, deniable pressure and constant reminders that the world’s most important oil artery sits beside Iranian territory. The current war is more dangerous because that method is now being used under direct U.S. and Israeli attack, when restraint is weaker and escalation is easier.
What could make Tehran’s gamble backfire
Iran’s wager is still risky. A prolonged disruption would hit Iran’s own export lifelines, strain relationships with Asian buyers it cannot afford to lose and invite a broader naval response from the United States and its partners. It also assumes the Guards can keep enough missiles, drones and command structure intact to sustain repeated shocks without exhausting their leverage first.
Still, the danger for Washington and Israel is that Tehran may not need a conventional military win to claim a strategic one. If shipping stays choked, energy prices remain volatile and allied governments begin treating economic stability as urgently as battlefield success, Iran’s leaders can argue that survival itself became leverage. That is what makes the current bet so dangerous: it is designed less to win fast than to make everyone else pay for taking too long.
