BAGHDAD — Iraq’s federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government have resumed exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey’s Ceyhan port. This restores a key northern oil artery more than two years after a legal dispute shut it down, as of Sept. 27, 2025. The restart follows an interim deal that hands federal marketer SOMO control over Kurdish barrels. It temporarily eases a long-running struggle over who speaks for Iraq’s northern oil.
Washington’s role has been unusually direct. For more than a year, the U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration pushed Iraqi leaders to reopen the route. Diplomats were sent to Baghdad for negotiations. Washington warned that failure to act could trigger sanctions. This was part of a wider effort to curb Iranian influence and stabilise oil markets. In July, Iranian-backed militias used drones to hit U.S.-operated fields in Kurdistan, sharply curbing regional output. Pressure then intensified, as a recent Reuters investigation described as ‘extremely intensive’ lobbying of Iraq’s top energy officials. A source in that story said Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered ‘some tough messages to Baghdad.’ He warned leaders that ‘a moment of choosing was at hand’ as Baghdad, Erbil, and foreign operators raced to finalise the deal. This deal ultimately restored oil flow through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.
U.S. leverage over the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline
Under the new arrangement, SOMO now markets crude from the Kurdistan Region. Foreign operators are compensated via a per-barrel fee paid from an escrow account. Initial flows of about 180,000 to 190,000 barrels per day are expected to rise toward 230,000 bpd as more fields ramp back up. These figures come from Iraqi officials cited by Reuters reporting from Ceyhan. Iraq’s OPEC delegate says that exports near 3.6 million bpd will remain within the country’s current quota. This allows Baghdad to reassert itself in oil markets without formally breaking cartel discipline.
A policy brief by the Washington Institute argues that renewed flows through the Iraq–Turkey Pipeline give the United States an extra lever in great-power competition. This is achieved by nudging Turkey away from discounted Russian barrels and binding Ankara more closely to Baghdad’s economy. The analysis notes that the U.S.-brokered framework routes all northern exports through SOMO. This simultaneously reassures Iraq about federal control and creates a more predictable environment for American and other foreign operators invested along the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.
A contested lifeline with a long memory
The latest agreement sits atop decades of turmoil around the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. This longstanding history is key to understanding recent developments. Since the 1990s, the line has been repeatedly knocked out by war, sanctions and insurgent attacks; Global Energy Monitor counts more than 20 sabotage incidents between 2003 and 2008 alone, severely limiting export capacity from northern Iraq. The pattern of instability continued as militants again targeted the route in 2013, twice bombing sections near Mosul and briefly halting crude shipments to Ceyhan, as detailed in a 2013 Reuters dispatch and other records.
Control over the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has also mirrored shifting internal power balances. For example, after Islamic State fighters were pushed out of northern Iraq in 2017, Baghdad ordered its North Oil Company to rehabilitate the federally controlled line to Turkey and bypass Kurdish-operated infrastructure. This was viewed in a 2017 Reuters report as an attempt to reclaim both territory and export leverage from the Kurdistan Regional Government. The contest over pipeline control then shifted into the legal arena. In March 2023, an arbitration tribunal in Paris found that Turkey had breached the 1973 pipeline treaty by loading Kurdish oil without Baghdad’s consent. This prompted Iraq to halt all northern exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and triggered a multi-billion-dollar damages bill.
Power shift or temporary truce?
U.S. officials now present the restart as proof that Baghdad is edging out of Tehran’s shadow. By forcing Iraqi leaders to reopen the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, Washington showed it can still shape major economic decisions in Iraq. This is especially true where American oil companies are directly exposed. Analysts also note that re-routing northern crude back into the legal export system reduces reliance on truck-based smuggling networks. These networks flourished while the pipeline was shut and allegedly funnelled money to Iranian-backed militias.
Yet despite these shifts, the power balance remains fragile. The current export deal is interim and subject to review. Iraq and Turkey are still haggling over unpaid arbitration awards, and Ankara has already signalled that the decades-old pipeline treaty will expire in July 2026, creating fresh uncertainty about long-term transit rights. Meanwhile, Baghdad continues to contest gas and oil contracts that the Kurdistan Regional Government signed without federal approval, while Iran-aligned militias retain both firepower and political clout. If these disputes reignite—or if armed groups again turn their sights on energy infrastructure—the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline could quickly revert from a symbol of U.S. influence and Iraqi compromise to a bargaining chip, or target, in Iraq’s unresolved struggle over power and oil.
