DHAKA, Bangladesh — The United States is preparing to pitch Bangladesh a package of American and allied defense systems as alternatives to Chinese hardware as Washington ramps up engagement with Dhaka ahead of the country’s national election Thursday. The US Bangladesh defense push is being driven by concern that a Beijing-backed drone factory deal and other pending procurement talks could deepen Bangladesh’s dependence on Chinese military supply chains, Feb. 11, 2026.
U.S. Ambassador Brent T. Christensen said Washington wants to spell out the “risks” of certain types of Chinese engagement while offering Dhaka other pathways to meet its capability needs, told Reuters in an interview. He did not publicly identify which systems the United States and its partners would propose.
China’s foreign ministry pushed back, saying China and Bangladesh cooperate across political, economic and security fields and that the relationship is “not directed against any third party,” according to the Reuters report. In Dhaka, the defense debate is unfolding against a charged political backdrop: a Gen Z-led uprising toppled then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, and she later fled to India, Reuters said.
US Bangladesh defense: what Washington is trying to change
At the core of the US Bangladesh defense push is an effort to widen Dhaka’s options beyond low-cost Chinese platforms and financing — a combination that has long appealed to Bangladesh’s planners but can bring interoperability limits, training lock-in and parts dependence over time. U.S. officials have increasingly framed the pitch around resilience and “trusted” supply chains, while also emphasizing that Bangladesh’s next government will set its own defense priorities.
The US Bangladesh defense relationship has also been built through recurring military-to-military talks and exercises. In late 2024, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command hosted Bangladesh officials for the 11th Bilateral Defense Dialogue, where both sides discussed exercises, exchanges, capability development and military education, the command said in a readout. Those engagements have typically focused on cooperation and readiness rather than headline-grabbing arms deals — but Washington now appears eager to translate dialogue into concrete procurement alternatives.
Beijing-backed drone factory deal sharpens the pressure
The immediate catalyst is Bangladesh’s decision to move forward on a drone manufacturing and assembly plan backed by China’s defense industry. Bangladesh’s Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate said the Bangladesh Air Force and China Electronics Technology Group Corporation International (CETC) signed a government-to-government agreement to establish a UAV manufacturing and assembly facility and to transfer technology, according to Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha. The ISPR statement said Bangladesh would initially gain the capability to manufacture and assemble medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAVs and vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAVs.
Reuters reported that the drone factory plan has raised concern among foreign diplomats and comes as Beijing’s footprint in Bangladesh grows. For Washington, the worry is less about any single facility than what it signals: a higher level of defense-industrial integration with China at a moment when Dhaka is also weighing other big-ticket buys.
One such track involves fighter aircraft. Pakistan and Bangladesh have discussed a potential defense pact that includes the sale of JF-17 Thunder jets — a multirole aircraft co-developed by Pakistan and China — Reuters previously reported. The combination of drones plus fighters, U.S. officials argue privately, could lock Bangladesh’s air force deeper into Chinese-origin ecosystems for decades.
Long-running trends behind the US Bangladesh defense debate
The US Bangladesh defense push is landing in a country where Chinese equipment has been a fixture for years. A CSIS ChinaPower analysis, drawing on SIPRI arms-transfer data, says China supplied an estimated 2.6 billion trend-indicator-value (TIV) worth of weapons to Bangladesh from 2010 to 2020 — about 73.6% of Bangladesh’s foreign military acquisitions in that period — according to the CSIS ChinaPower Project. Chinese loans and pricing have helped drive that pattern, the CSIS analysis notes.
Earlier milestones also illustrate the arc. Bangladesh took delivery of Chinese submarines in 2016 as it expanded its naval capabilities in the Bay of Bengal, a move that drew regional scrutiny at the time, Defense News reported. That procurement history helps explain why Washington is now emphasizing “alternatives” — and why Chinese officials bristle at U.S. messaging.
At the same time, US Bangladesh defense ties have faced periodic friction tied to governance and human rights concerns. In December 2021, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion and several current and former officials over what it described as widespread allegations of serious human rights abuse, according to an OFAC press release. That episode remains a reference point for Bangladeshi officials who argue Washington’s approach can be overly political — and for U.S. officials who say partnership deepens when institutions are accountable.
What happens after the vote
With Bangladesh voting Thursday, the timing of the US Bangladesh defense pitch matters. Christensen has said the United States will work with whichever government voters choose, Reuters reported, and Washington has also signaled it wants Dhaka and New Delhi to maintain workable ties to support regional stability.
The next government will ultimately decide whether the US Bangladesh defense push yields new purchases, expanded training, or simply sharper competition among suppliers. But with a Beijing-backed drone factory now moving from concept to implementation — and fighter-jet talks circulating in the region — Washington’s message is likely to stay consistent: diversify, scrutinize long-term dependencies, and keep Bangladesh’s defense modernization from becoming a single-supplier bet.
