Pakistan defence production is caught between demand and dependence
The sharpest reminder comes from new SIPRI arms-transfer data, which shows Pakistan’s arms imports grew 66% between 2016-20 and 2021-25, with China supplying 80% of those imports. For a country trying to sell more military hardware abroad, that level of supplier concentration makes self-reliance more than a slogan. It is a hedge against procurement shocks, pricing pressure and the political limits that come with depending too heavily on one external pipeline.
Pakistan’s own policy language points in the same direction. On the ministry’s Mission & Functions page, the Ministry of Defence Production says it wants an internationally competitive sector built on public-private partnerships and self-reliance, while explicitly listing indigenous production, research and development, defence exports and export marketing among its core functions. That combination matters because export success in this business is rarely just about a platform; it is about spare parts, sustainment, training and the ability to keep delivery schedules intact.
Demand, meanwhile, is no longer theoretical. Reuters reported in January on surging interest in Pakistan’s “combat tested” weapons, saying Islamabad had held talks with 13 countries and that six to eight negotiations were already at an advanced stage. Analysts cited supply disruptions linked to the war in Ukraine and conflict in the Middle East as part of the reason buyers are looking for alternatives. The same report described the JF-17 as the cornerstone of Pakistan’s weapons-production programme and said upgrades could significantly lift output from roughly 20 aircraft a year by the end of 2027.
Indonesia offers a glimpse of how quickly interest could become a capacity problem. In another Reuters report on a potential Indonesia deal covering JF-17 fighters and drones, officials discussed a package that could involve more than 40 aircraft alongside wider defence cooperation. Even if only part of that pipeline converts into firm contracts, Pakistan will be judged not just on price, but on whether it can build, deliver and support systems at scale.
Pakistan defence production did not reach this point overnight
The export story has been building in steps. In July 2022, Pakistan’s Press Information Department said during a ministerial visit that Pakistan Ordnance Factories was already exporting to more than 40 countries, showing that the industrial base had external customers long before the latest wave of attention around fighter jets and drones.
A bigger milestone came in September 2024, when Reuters reported that Pakistan had signed a JF-17 Block III contract with Azerbaijan. That mattered because it turned the aircraft from a frequently promoted flagship into a confirmed state-to-state sale, strengthening Pakistan’s case that it could compete for higher-value deals rather than remain confined to ammunition and legacy systems.
What Pakistan defence production must fix next
The next phase is harder than winning headlines. Pakistan now has to widen local manufacturing depth, bring more private firms into electronics, software, drones, materials and subsystem work, and reduce the gap between assembling a product and owning the industrial know-how behind it. Otherwise, export growth could still leave the country exposed to the same foreign bottlenecks it is trying to outgrow.
That is why the current boom looks less like a finish line and more like a stress test. Pakistan has a rare opening to use export interest as financing for deeper indigenisation, stronger after-sales networks and steadier foreign-exchange earnings. If it succeeds, the country could move from being a heavily import-dependent buyer with a few export wins to a more credible mid-tier supplier. If it does not, rising demand may simply expose how much of Pakistan’s defence production story is still waiting to be built.
