Why enriched uranium still matters
The issue is not abstract. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said much of the near-bomb-grade material is believed to be in Isfahan, with other quantities believed to be at Natanz and possibly Fordow. Using the IAEA’s own yardstick, that pre-strike stockpile could provide the explosive needed for 10 nuclear weapons if enriched further. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful, but the IAEA says it is the only non-nuclear-weapon state to have produced and accumulated uranium at that level.
That is why writing off the stockpile does not make the problem disappear. Experts say a forced retrieval operation could require around 1,000 personnel, heavy equipment, hazmat protection and nuclear specialists, a reminder that physically removing or downblending the material is far harder than saying it can be watched by satellite.
Enriched uranium was a red line until it wasn’t
The reversal is notable because, just weeks before the latest shift, Washington had demanded Iran relinquish its highly enriched uranium, even as Tehran floated a compromise that would send part abroad and dilute the rest. That earlier framework at least recognized the core point: the 60% stockpile was the part of the file both sides were still trying most directly to neutralize.
Taken together, the buried sites, the inspection gap and the complexity of retrieval suggest the danger is harder to control than to threaten. Surveillance may help detect movement, but it does not restore verified custody or answer the IAEA’s unresolved safeguards questions.
A crisis years in the making
This did not begin with the latest rhetorical turn. The chain runs back to Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s 2021 decision to begin enriching uranium to 60% purity, and the IAEA’s 2024 warning, reported by Reuters, that Tehran was dramatically accelerating production of near-bomb-grade material. Together, those steps help explain why today’s debate is no longer about whether 60% enriched uranium matters, but about who can still verify, contain or reduce it.
A credible end state would therefore require restored IAEA access, a verified inventory, and an agreement that exports, seals or dilutes the 60% material instead of merely watching it underground. Until that happens, enriched uranium remains the part of the Iran file that still has to be solved.
