WASHINGTON — The United States and Russia are weeks away from the Feb. 5 expiration of New START, the last treaty that still places verified caps on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, a deadline that arms-control experts warn could open the door to rapid force expansions and sharper crisis risks, Jan. 8, 2026.
With relations frozen by the war in Ukraine and no successor agreement in place, the end of New START would remove legally binding limits and most transparency tools at a moment when both countries are modernizing their nuclear forces and miscalculation fears are rising, according to Reuters’ latest reporting on the looming deadline.
What New START still constrains — and what disappears without it
New START, signed in 2010, limits deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems while also requiring data exchanges and allowing on-site inspections meant to verify compliance. A Congressional Research Service primer notes the treaty’s central caps and the strains that have built since Russia announced it was suspending participation in 2023, including interruptions to key transparency measures (CRS’ updated overview).
Even with inspections already disrupted in recent years, many analysts argue the treaty’s ceilings still matter because they set predictable boundaries for both militaries and discourage worst-case planning. Without New START, each side could upload additional warheads onto existing missiles or expand deployed launchers faster than new production lines would suggest, a shift that can be hard to detect quickly and easy to misread.
New START extension talk returns, but a real deal remains elusive
Moscow has floated the idea of a temporary arrangement to keep observing New START-style limits past Feb. 5, but that would be political rather than legally binding unless it is formalized and paired with verification steps. A recent Atlantic Council issue brief on extending the New START limits argues that any stopgap should be judged by whether it preserves meaningful constraints and transparency — not just a headline promise.
Analysts also caution that “doing nothing” is not a neutral outcome. A post-New START environment could accelerate an action-reaction cycle in which each side fields capabilities “just in case,” then cites the other’s deployments as justification for further moves.
The long slide to the brink: New START pressures built over years
The treaty was born out of a push to replace earlier strategic arms limits, with the U.S. and Russian presidents finalizing terms ahead of the 2010 signing in Prague (Reuters, March 2010).
After years of implementation, Washington and Moscow agreed in early 2021 to extend New START for five years, buying time for follow-on negotiations that never materialized (Arms Control Today’s 2021 extension report).
Tensions deepened in 2023 when Russia said it would suspend participation in the treaty, further weakening the remaining guardrails (Arms Control Today on Russia’s suspension). Since then, experts have increasingly treated the 2026 deadline as a hard stop, not a routine renewal.
How to avoid a post-New START free-for-all
Arms-control specialists say an urgent, realistic agenda would prioritize near-term risk reduction: restoring channels for crisis communication, restarting regular data exchanges where possible, and building interim verification steps that can survive political shocks. A Royal United Services Institute analysis argues that even imperfect measures can slow momentum toward an unconstrained competition while more ambitious talks remain out of reach.
With less than a month left, the choices are narrowing fast. Whether through a limited extension framework, a reciprocal political commitment backed by transparency steps, or a new negotiating track, officials in Washington and Moscow face the same strategic reality: once New START lapses, rebuilding trust and verification from scratch is far harder than preserving what still exists today.
